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Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MELISSA CAROL COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 46255
Elmore County Case No. CR-2016-2406

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Coleman failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
sentenced her to ten years with two and one-half years determinate upon her conviction for
vehicular manslaughter, and denied her motion to reduce the sentence?
ARGUMENT
Coleman Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Coleman was driving under the influence, with a BAC of 0.13, when she drove into

oncoming traffic, and struck another car, killing Robert Kingery. (PSI, p. 5. 1) The state charged
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Citations to the PSI are to the page numbers of the confidential documents electronic file.
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Coleman with vehicular manslaughter. (R., pp. 31-32.) Coleman entered a guilty plea to the
charge. (R., pp. 41-44; Tr., p. 9, L. 20 – p. 10, L. 20; p. 17, L. 9 – p. 22, L. 12.) The district court
imposed a sentence of ten years with two and one-half years determinate. (R., pp. 57-60; Tr., p.
80, Ls. 4-6.) Coleman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 61-64.)
Coleman filed a motion to reduce her sentence, arguing that her educational efforts while
in custody merited a lesser sentence. (Aug., pp. 1-2.) The district court denied the motion. (Aug.,
pp. 17-20.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).
“‘If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.’” State
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v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 288, 297 P.3d 244, 251 (2013) (quoting State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)). See also State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d 381,
385 (Ct. App. 2015) (“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for
leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”).

C.

Coleman Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392
P.3d at 1236–37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
In imposing sentence, the district court recognized its discretion and applied the relevant
legal standards. (Tr., p. 77, L. 21 – p. 78, L. 3.) The district court based the ten year sentence with
two and one-half years determinate on the seriousness of the crime, Coleman’s need for mental
health treatment while incarcerated, and the hope that Coleman could be paroled and have an
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opportunity to complete her rehabilitation in the community. (Tr., p. 80, Ls. 4-25.) The record
thus shows that the district court exercised its discretion, and that exercise was reasonable.
Coleman contends the district court abused its discretion, citing several mitigating factors
that she believes the district court did not give sufficient weight. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-7.)
However, the district court considered these mitigating factors. (Tr., p. 77, L. 20 – p. 83, L. 12.)
Deciding what weight to give them, and what weight to give the aggravating factors, is the soul of
discretion. Coleman has failed to show that the district court had an unreasonable view of the
facts.
Nor has Coleman shown an abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of her Rule 35
motion. “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013)
(internal quotations omitted). “In conducting our review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion,
we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness
of the original sentence.” Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d at 385.
The district court concluded the motion did not show that the sentence was excessive.
(Aug., pp. 17-19.) The district court concluded that, because it was aware that Coleman had taken
rehabilitative classes before sentencing and had recommended “further classes while in custody,”
Coleman’s claims that she was taking such classes was “not additional information.” (Aug., p.
18.) In addition, the district court “fashioned a sentence taking into account the serious nature of
the crime as well as mitigating circumstances” and the “need for specific and general deterrence”
to give the proper mix of determinate and indeterminate time. (Aug., pp. 18-19.) The sentence
“was appropriate to ensure Defendant is supervised after her release into the community for a
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sufficiently long time to ensure she does not revert back to criminal activity.” (Aug., p. 19.) The
district court correctly concluded that Coleman had not presented additional information showing
the sentence to be excessive.
Coleman argues that the district court erred by not considering her representations that she
had completed classes at IDOC as “new” information. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) While
Coleman is correct that her information was “new” in the sense that she had not completed the
classes prior to sentencing, she completely fails to address the district court’s reasoning that the
information was not “new” in the sense that it was unanticipated at sentencing. (Aug., p. 18.)
Indeed, because Coleman had already started taking classes relevant to her rehabilitation, and
because the district court had recommended she continue taking such rehabilitative steps, the
“new” classes were nothing more than Coleman continuing a course of conduct she had claimed
at sentencing and which the district court had endorsed. Because the Court had already factored
in Coleman’s rehabilitative education, her claims she was taking rehabilitative classes was not new
or additional information showing that the sentence was excessive.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2019.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of March, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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